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ABSTRACT
In recent times, the use of Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for tasks which
involve high endurance or perilous environments, has become increasingly
vital. A typical problem is that of information collection, in particular when
multiple UAVs are involved, which prompts an important problem of routing
these UAVs through the search environment with the goal of maximizing the
collected information. Most of the previous line of work assumes a central-
ized control and full communication among the UAVs, thus posing this as an
optimization problem solved via centralized solutions. However, in applica-
tions where communication is infeasible, each UAV must individually solve
the problem. Assuming a natural scenario of UAVs being compensated for
the collected information makes them self-interested agents trying to maxi-
mize their payoffs. Consequently, our game-theoretic approach is a natural
fit. While our game model is primarily based on the game model used in a
previous work [1], it is also significantly generalized, incorporating interest-
ing facets of information fusion and multi-modality-composed information.
This game is closely related to the well-studied classes of congestion-type and
resource selection games, but cannot be cast into these classes unless certain
critical constraints are relaxed. Our contribution to this literature, is a result
on existence of pure Nash equilibria via existence of the Finite Improvement
Property, which applies to any singleton congestion-type games having a cer-
tain class of payoff functions. Finally, to our best knowledge, our results
providing theoretically guaranteed tight bounds on the Price of anarchy and
Price of stability, are the first such results in the literature involving a game-
theoretic approach to UAV routing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent times, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in modern
battlefields has become increasingly vital and beneficial, particularly owing
to their utility in environments that are — as characterized by [2] — dull,
dirty, and dangerous. That is, they are particularly useful for tasks which
involve high endurance and/or perilous environments. One such task is that
of collecting information via surveillance of such sensitive region. Moreover,
when there are multiple UAVs at disposal, an important problem is that of
routing these UAVs in the region in order to avoid collisions and redundant
duplication of efforts while maximizing the collected information. This can
be posed as an optimization problem which may be effectively solved using
centralized algorithms. However, these do not apply to applications where
communication is infeasible so that each UAV must individually solve the
problem, or scenarios in which the UAVs are self-interested agents trying
to maximize their payoffs. Hence, in this paper, we study a problem where
UAVs are self-interested competitive agents trying to route themselves in the
surveillance region so as to maximize their own collected information — thus,
a mere single-objective centralized solution does not apply.
The problem of information collection has been widely studied in the search
theory literature. A classical search problem here is to maximize the prob-
ability of detecting a hidden target, for instance, as in [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. On
the other hand, [9], associates a potential information gain with each sub-
region based on an entropy based function and aim to maximize the total
gain. In this paper, we resort to a similar model, where the region of surveil-
lance is divided into discrete cells each having an associated information
value, which we treat as an abstract entity allowing flexibility for what these
values capture; possibly the target-detection probabilities as in the former
problem. Our basic model of the search environment and the information
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collection formulation, is mathematically equivalent to that of [1], in terms
of discretization of the search space and time-steps, and payoff definitions,
albeit with some other interpretational differences with various parameters.
Additionally, our model also incorporates some interesting and useful exten-
sions. The first is that of information fusion, which “can be defined as the
combination of multiple sources to obtain improved information (cheaper,
greater quality, or greater relevance)” [10] and has been used in robotics and
military applications [11]. Secondly, our model allows the information to be
multi-modal i.e. present in the form of multiple modalities such as vision,
audition, tactition, thermoception etc. These additional aspects make our
information collection problem very versatile in terms of applicability. More-
over, to our best knowledge, our results providing theoretically guaranteed
tight bounds on the Price of anarchy and Price of stability, are the first such
results in the related literature.
A large body of the previous work on the routing problem such as [12, 13],
assume a centralized control and full communication among the UAVs and
the central controller. However, the infeasibility of communication can be
a very critical constraint in cases such as when surveilling in sensitive areas
during covert military operations. Consequently, constructing a centralized
solution does not apply. In these situations, each UAV has to construct its
own route, since it cannot dynamically obtain information about where the
other UAVs are. Furthermore, we consider a natural arrangement that the
UAVs are compensated for the information they collect, which makes them
self-interested agents trying to maximize the information they collect. As
a result, a game-theoretic approach is a perfect fit to tackle this problem.
Game-theoretic models have been deployed in numerous other routing prob-
lems in transportation and networking applications such as [14] and [15]. The
class of games we formulate in this paper, is closely related to the class of
congestion games or resource-selection games, and numerous other variants,
defined and studied in — most notably [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Our class of
games has some critical differences with these well-studied classes of games,
in terms of cost-sharing protocols, player weights etc., and hence the results
established on these classes of games do not directly apply in the general case,
making our theoretical results on the existence of pure equilibria and bounds
on Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy, interesting and non-trivial.
2
CHAPTER 2
TWO-PLAYER SINGLE-STEP GAME
2.1 Problem Description and Game Formulation
We define the information collection problem as a game between two play-
ers. The surveillance environment is discretized into sub-regions referred
to as cells. The problem can be formulated in two settings, which we call
correlated and non-correlated. In the former setting, the information to be
collected is in the form of a single modality. Thus, as the UAVs try to max-
imize the information collected, a cell which is attractive to one UAV is also
to other UAVs — more specifically, the intrinsic worth from visiting the cells
occurs in an identical order to all the UAVs. This mutuality of the preference
among cells leads to the name ‘correlated’. This is not necessarily true, when
extended to the case of multiple modalities constituting the information in a
cell. The UAVs have different sensors for capturing the information of each
kind (i.e. modality), and the information of each kind available in a cell could
be present in largely varying amounts. Thus, the UAVs may value a cell dif-
ferently depending on which modalities their sensors are most effective for.
Hence, we call this setting non-correlated. Naturally, the correlated setting
can be realized as a special case of the non-correlated setting. Hence, we es-
tablish results for the non-correlated case and provide stronger implications
for the correlated case.
The game is defined as follows. There are two players each corresponding
to a UAV and each has a known initial cell. Each player has n pure strategies,
corresponding to n different cells the player can move to in the next time-
step; n is typically equal to 8 or 9 in the standard problem specifications,
but our model is general enough to allow an arbitrary value of n. Also,
while we assume the same number of cells accessible to both the players, this
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constraint can be easily relaxed. Next, We have M different modalities for
each of which, each cell has a certain amount of information available. The
payoffs of the players — as precisely defined later on — linearly scale with
these information values and hence, the values can be taken to be from the
range r0, 1s wlog. As the information comprises of M different modalities,
we represent it as a vector of dimension M . Each UAV has M different
sensors to collect these M kinds of information. The payoff of player i, i.e.,
the information it can collect, from moving to cell j depends on
1. information available in the cell j,
2. effectiveness of its M sensors denoted by ~ρi “ pρi1, . . . , ρimq, s.t. 0 ě
ρim ě 1, @m, and,
3. whether the cell gets shared, i.e., whether the other player also moves
to the same cell simultaneously.
This formulation implies that each player has at most two different payoffs
possible from each strategy and consequently, we can represent the payoffs
with the payoff matrix as follows. Let αj and α
1
j denote the payoffs of player
1 from strategy j when the corresponding cell is unshared and when shared,
respectively. Similarly, let βj and β
1
j denote the payoffs of player 2 from
strategy j when the corresponding cell is unshared and shared, respectively.
The current locations of the players may be different, and thus, there may
be some cells which are commonly accessible to both and some which are
private. For convenience, we order the strategies of players so that if there
is a common cell where both players can move, then the index of the corre-
sponding strategy is same for both the players, and smaller than the index
of any strategy corresponding to the respective private cells. Depending on
their current locations, suppose there are k common cells (0 ď k ď n). Then
the payoff matrix of the game will be as shown in Table 1.
Observe that the α1j and β1j appear only on the diagonal entries (1 ď j ď k).
This matrix formulation is general enough to allow any definitions of payoff
computation, and different formulae for shared payoffs. We formalize these
definitions for our game in the following section.
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pα11, β11q ¨ ¨ ¨ pα1, βkq pα1, βk`1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pα1, βnq
pα2, β1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pα2, βkq pα2, βk`1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pα2, βnq
... ¨ ¨ ¨ ... ¨ ¨ ¨ ... ...
pαk, β1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pα1k, β1kq pαk, βk`1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pαk, βnq
pαk`1, β1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pαk`1, βkq pαk`1, βk`1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pαk`1, βnq
... ¨ ¨ ¨ ... ¨ ¨ ¨ ... ...
pαn, β1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pαn, βkq pαn, βk`1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pαn, βnq
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the 2-player single-step game
2.2 Parameter Specification and Payoff Definition
We denote the information corresponding to a cell as a vector ~v, so that each
vk corresponds to the information corresponding to modality k. Next, we
have the following parameters:
Sensor effectiveness ~ρi of UAV i: If the information available in a cell
is ~v, then the information obtained by UAV i with sensor effectiveness ~ρi
is ~ρi ¨ ~v. This formula defines the payoffs without sharing. When a cell is
shared, the total information obtained for type j is computed as follows: the
information collected by player 1 is ρ1jvj, and that by player 2 is a fraction
ρ2j of what is left, i.e., p1 ´ ρ1jqvj. Thus, the total information collected is
ρ1jvj ` p1 ´ ρ1jqvjρ2j. Note that this expression is symmetric for both the
players. Then, this total payoff is shared in the ratio of ρ1j : ρ2j by the two
players. As a result, UAV i gains ρijvjp1 ´ ρ1jρ2jρ1j`ρ2j q. We can write the net
information gain for UAV i as p~rd ~ρiq¨~v or ~ρi ¨p~rd~vq, where rj “ p1´ ρ1jρ2jρ1j`ρ2j q.
Information fusion parameter ~γl: We incorporate the concept of infor-
mation fusion by saying that the maximum information gain from a cell may
be higher if more than one UAV visit this cell together due to the information
fusion. We model this by introducing fusion parameters ~γl “ pγl1, . . . , γlMq,
where l denotes the number of UAVs visiting a cell simultaneously, thereby
involved in the fusion process, and γli denotes the fusion parameter for modal-
ity i. We say that in the case of fusion, the information available in a cell can
be treated to be ~γl d ~v, if l players visit the cell simultaneously. That is, the
information of each modality j gets scaled by a constant factor γlj. Clearly,
~γ1 “ p1, . . . , 1q, and γlj ě 1, @l ě 2, @j, so that information fusion only in-
creases the information gain. When dealing with a 2-player game, we denote
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the fusion parameter ~γ2 as simply ~γ for convenience. Thus, for a cell corre-
sponding to strategy j, having information ~vj, the shared payoffs of the the
two players can be written as α1j “ p~rd ~ρ1d ~γ2q ¨ ~vj and β1j “ p~rd ~ρ1d ~γ2q ¨ ~vj.
Now, we further assume that the following conditions hold for the fusion
process, which are all practical and help impose a reasonable structure to
the problem:
– @i, α1i ą αi ô β1i ą βi
– @i, j, pα1i ą αi ô α1j ą αjq and pβ1i ą βi ô β1j ą βjq
– @i, j, pαi ą αj ô α1i ą α1jq and pβi ą βj ô β1i ą β1jq
Together, these conditions imply that, if the fusion gives better shared pay-
offs than the unshared ones, it does so for both the players, in all the cells,
and the shared payoff values follow the same order as the respective unshared
payoff values for the individual players. The same implications hold even for
the case when the shared payoffs with fusion, are less than the respective
unshared payoffs.
For this game, we establish results for the existence and computation of
Nash Equilibria, and bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) and Price of
Anarchy(PoA). These results differ, depending on whether there is moderate
fusion (αi ą α1i @i), or significant fusion (αi ă α1i @i). First, we establish the
results for the former case.
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CHAPTER 3
MODERATE INFORMATION FUSION
In this setting, we prove that a pure NE always exists and is computable in
linear time. We also prove tight bounds on PoA and PoS. Finally, we show
that the number of mixed equilibria has a low upper-bound — linear in the
number of strategies, and that the mixed equilibria are Pareto-dominated by
the pure equilibria.
Recall that, as described in the previous chapter, we have, αi ă α1i @i, and
βi ă β1i @i. That is, sharing a cell is never preferred over visiting it solely, by
either player.
3.1 Existence and Computation of Pure Nash
Equilibrium
Computing a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is, in general, PPAD-
complete [22], and checking if a pure NE exists, is NP-complete [23]. How-
ever, the payoff matrix of the UAV game is special and we show that there
always exists a pure Nash equilibrium and it can be computed in Opnq time.
Notation: The cell corresponding to strategy s of player i, is denoted by
cellipsq. The set of cells corresponding to a set of strategies S of player i, is
denoted by cellsipSq.
Theorem 1. There always exists a pure Nash equilibrium in a two player
UAV game and it can be computed in Opnq time where n is the number of
strategies for each player.
Proof. We sort the strategies for each player in the non-increasing order
of available information in the corresponding cells. Let the order for the
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first player be i1, i2, . . . , in, and for the second player be j1, j2, . . . , jn. Fur-
ther, we assume that in case of equal payoffs, the strategies are ordered
in the increasing order of index-values. Since the fusion is moderate, αi1 ,
and βj1 are the largest possible payoffs for the two players respectively. Let
A1 “ ti | αi “ αi1u be the set of strategies of player 1 corresponding to cells
with the largest possible information gain, and A2 “ argmaxiRA1 αi be the
set of strategies of player 1 corresponding to cells with the second largest
possible information gain. Similarly, let B1 and B2 be the sets of strategies
of player 2 corresponding to cells with the largest and the second largest
information gain, respectively. We now consider the following cases:
Case 1: |A1| ą 1 and |B1| ą 1
In this case, it is easy to see that pi, jq is a pure Nash Equilibrium for every
i P A1, j P B1 such that cell1piq ‰ cell2pjq. Since A1 and B1 have at least 2
strategies in them, there exist many such equilibria, in particular, at least 2
when each has only 2 strategies. Further, |A1| ą 1 ñ Di P A1 such that player
2 is not moving into cell1piq, hence, i is in the best response set of player 1.
Similarly, the best response of player 2 must lie in B2. Consequently, there
are no other pure equilibria. Also, each of these pure NE, maximizes the
total gain (i.e., social welfare).
Case 2: |A1| “ 1 and |B1| ą 1
a) cell1pi1q R cells2pB1q: Same as in Case 1, since B1 has at least 2 strate-
gies, player 2’s best response to any pure strategy of player 1, must lie
in B1. As per the condition here, this best response cannot be i1, and
so, i1 is always the best response of player 1. Thus, pi1, jq for every
j P B1, is a pure equilibrium and these are the only equilibria.
b) cell1pi1q P cells2pB1q: If player 2 does not play i1, we have the same
situation as Case 2a, and thus, pi1, jq for every j P B1zti1u, is a pure
equilibrium. Additionally, there could be other equilibria depending on
the following:
i. αi2 ă α1i1 : Thus, i1 is a dominant strategy for player 1, and so it
will always play that. The best response of player 2 to this is any
j P B1zti1u, and thus all such pi1, jq, are the only equilibria.
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ii. αi2 ě α1i1 : Thus, if player 2 plays i1, player 1 can play any strategy
i P A2, and it is easy to see that pi, i1q is indeed an equilibrium.
Case 3: |A1| ą 1 and |B1| “ 1
This case is symmetric to Case 2 and a similar analysis follows.
Case 4: |A1| “ 1 and |B1| “ 1
a) cell1pi1q “ cell2pj1q : Thus, the players’ most preferred cells coincide.
We make further cases as follows, each characterized by two conditions.
One is for comparing αi2 with α
1
i1
, and the other is for comparing βi2
with β1i1 . If both the conditions strict inequalities, only one of the
following four cases exists and the only pure Nash equilibria are the
ones discussed therein, however, in case of an equality for any of the
two respective conditions, two or all of the following four cases and the
equilibria described therein, may coexist.
i. αi2 ď α1i1 and βj2 ď β1j1 : In this case i1 is a dominant strategy for
player 1, and j1 is a dominant strategy for player 2. Hence, pi1, j1q
is a pure Nash equilibrium.
ii. αi2 ď α1i1 and βj2 ě β1j1 : In this case i1 is a dominant strategy
for player 1, and any strategy j P B2 is a best response to it, for
player 2, and hence, any such pi1, jq is a pure Nash equilibrium.
iii. αi2 ě α1i1 and βj2 ď β1j1 : Similar to case ii, j1 is a dominant
strategy for player 2, and any strategy i P A2 is a best response to
it, for player 1. Hence, any such pi, j1q is a pure Nash equilibrium.
iv. αi2 ě α1i1 and βi2 ě β1i1 : This case is an anti-coordination game.
pi1, jq @j P B2, as well as pi, j1q, @i P A2 are all equilibria for this
case.
b) cell1pi1q ‰ cell2pj1q : In this case, pi1, j1q is trivially a pure equilib-
rium. There may be another pure equilibrium, if the two players each
occupy their opponent’s most preferred cell and this turns out to be
the best response to each other. It is easy to see that this translates
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to the conditions cell2pj1q P cells1pA2q, cell1pi1q P cells2pB2q, and,
βj2 ě β1j1 , αi2 ě α1i1 ; if these hold, pj1, i1q is also a Nash equilibrium.
From the above analysis, it is clear that there always exists a pure Nash
equilibrium. To see the computation complexity, first, note that A1 can
be computed in Opnq time by computing the maximum i1 in Opnq time.
Similarly, B1 can be computed in Opnq time. Further A2 and B2 can be
similarly computed in Opnq time by computing the second maximum payoffs.
Lastly, each of the conditions in the cases above can be computed in Opnq
time. Thus, a pure equilibrium can be computed in Opnq time.
In the next section, we analyze the PoS and PoA for this game.
3.2 Social Welfare
As concluded in the previous section, there always exists a pure Nash equi-
librium and it can be computed efficiently. We now investigate how good
or bad it can be with respect to the optimal solution which maximizes the
social welfare — which is defined as the sum of the individual payoffs of the
players. For this, we obtain bounds on pure Price of Stability (PoS) and
the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which are the two well-known metrics used in
economics and game theory, to quantify the efficiency of the equilibria. In
the following definitions, the best and the worst NE refer to those which give
the least and most social welfare among all equilibria.
Definition 1. The pure price of stability (PoS) is defined as:
PoS “ The optimal social welfare
social welfare for the best pure Nash equilibrium
.
First, we begin with the following well-known property.
Lemma 1. Let xi, yi, vi ě 0 for i = 1,2,. . . ,d. Then,
dř
i“1
xivi
dř
i“1
yivi
ď max
1ďiďd
xi
yi
.
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We now establish upper bounds on the pure PoS, first for the general param-
eters, and next, for a practical special case of identical sensors, i.e., ~ρ1 “ ~ρ2,
and no fusion.
Theorem 2. The pure PoS of the 2-player single-step game with moderate
fusion, is at most
1` max
1ďjďM
maxtρ1j, ρ2juppρ1j ` ρ2jq ´ pρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγjq
pρ1j ` ρ2jqpρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj .
Proof. We prove the result by analyzing the same various cases as discussed
in the proof of Theorem 1.
In Case 1, all pure equilibria achieve maximum social welfare. Hence the
pure PoS here is 1.
In Case 2 — both 2a and 2b, there exist equilibria pi1, jq for j P B1, which
maximize the social welfare, making the PoS equal to 1 for this case.
In Case 3, it being similar to Case 2, the PoS is again simply 1.
For Case 4a, let i1 “ j1 “ 1, and let the information in the cell corresponding
to strategy 1 be ~v. It implies that α1 “ ~ρ1 ¨~v and β1 “ ~ρ2 ¨~v, α11 “ p~ρ1d~rd~γq¨~v
and β11 “ p~ρ2d~rd~γq¨~v. Among the four cases possible here, more than one of
them coexisting gives rise to more pure equilibria and a possibly smaller PoS.
Hence, to bound the worst value, it suffices to analyze with the assumption
of each case existing exclusively, i.e., assuming a relation of strict inequality
between αi2 and α
1
i1
, as well as βi2 with β
1
i1
.
We analyze Case 4a-i first. We have αi2 ă α11 and βj2 ă β11, and thus, p1, 1q
is the unique equilibrium, with a social welfare of α11` β11. One can see, that
the maximum social welfare is achieved for either α1`βj2 or αi2`β1. Hence,
the PoS is at most
maxtαi2`β1,α1`βj2u
α11`β11 ď
maxtα11`β1,α1`β11u
α11`β11 . We can write,
α11 ` β1
α11 ` β11 “
p~ρ1 d ~r d ~γ ` ~ρ2q ¨ ~v
pp~ρ1 ` ~ρ2q d ~r d ~γq ¨ ~v
ď 1` max
1ďjďM ρ2j
pρ1j ` ρ2jq ´ pρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj
pρ1j ` ρ2jqpρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj .
The above inequality, follows from Lemma 1. Similarly, we can write
α1 ` β11
α11 ` β11 ď 1` max1ďjďM ρ1j
pρ1j ` ρ2jq ´ pρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj
pρ1j ` ρ2jqpρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj .
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Consequently, the PoS for this case is at most
1` max
1ďjďM
maxtρ1j, ρ2juppρ1j ` ρ2jq ´ pρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγjq
pρ1j ` ρ2jqpρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj .
For Case 4a-ii, We have αi2 ă α11 and βj2 ą β11. Any pure equilibrium is
of the form p1, jq for some j P B2, which gives a social welfare of α1 ` βj2 .
Since α1 ą α11 ą tαi, α1iu, @i ě 2, and β1 ą βj2 ą tβ1k, βju, @j ą 2, k ě 1, the
maximum social welfare is either α1 ` βj2 or αi2 ` β1. Therefore PoS is at
most maxt1, αi2`β1
α1`βj2 u ď maxt1,
α11`β1
α1`β11 u. It is easy to see that this is no worse
than
α11`β1
α11`β11 , and thus, no worse than the bound for Case 4a-i.
Similarly, it can be shown that Case 4a-iii gives a bound no worse than
Case 4a-i.
For Case 4a-iv, the two pure Nash equilibria of the game are pi1, j2q and
pi2, j1q. It is easy to check that one of them gives the maximum social wel-
fare, hence PoS for this case is 1.
Finally, in Case 4b, among the two possible pure NE, pi1, j1q corresponds to
the best social welfare, giving a PoS of 1.
Thus, Case 4a-i above gives the worst possible PoS, thereby establishing the
desired bound.
Next, we obtain a stronger result, for a special case.
Corollary 1. When the two players have identical sensors and the fusion is
absent, the pure PoS of the 2-player single-step game is at most 3{2.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2 by setting ~ρ1 “ ~ρ2 and ~γ “ p1, 1qT .
Next, we obtain similar results for PoA.
Definition 2. The price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as:
PoA “ The optimal social welfare
social welfare for the worst Nash equilibrium
.
Unlike the result for PoS, we establish upper bound results for the general
PoA, not just pure PoA. First, we do so for the general parameters, and
next, for the practical special case of the players having identical sensors, i.e.
~ρ1 “ ~ρ2, and fusion being absent.
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Theorem 3. The PoA of the 2-player single-step UAV game with moderate
fusion, is at most
max
1ďjďM
ρ1j ` ρ2j
pρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj .
Proof. Again, we prove the result by analyzing the same various cases as laid
out in the proof of Theorem 1.
In Case 1, all the pure equilibria achieve maximum social welfare. Hence the
pure PoA is 1 here.
In Case 2a and Case 2b-i as well, all the pure equilibria achieve maximum
social welfare, and so the pure PoA here, is 1. For Case 2b-ii, however, i.e.
when αi2 ě α1i1 and i1 P B1, we know that pi, i1q is an equilibrium for every
i P A2. This gives a total welfare of αi2 ` βj1 , which is lesser than the maxi-
mum welfare of αi1`βj1 achieved by playing pi1, jq for any j P B1zti1u. Thus,
the PoA is
αi1`βj1
αi2`βj1 , which is at most
αi1`βj1
α1i1`βj1
, under the constraint αi2 ě α1i1 .
Similarly, the PoA in Case 3 is at most
αi1`βj1
αi1`βj2 , which is at most
αi1`βj1
αi1`β1j1
.
For Case 4a, let i1 “ j1 “ 1, and let the information in the cell corresponding
to strategy 1 be ~v. It implies that α1 “ ~ρ1 ¨~v and β1 “ ~ρ2 ¨~v, α11 “ p~ρ1d~rd~γq¨~v
and β11 “ p~ρ2d~rd~γq ¨~v. Among the four cases possible here, more than one
of them coexisting gives rise to more pure equilibria and a possibly larger
PoA. However, to bound the worst value, it suffices to analyze with the as-
sumption of each case existing exclusively, and considering the worst bound
among the four. Thus, we assume a relation of strict inequality between αi2
and α1i1 , as well as βi2 with β
1
i1
.
For each of the cases 4a-i, 4a-ii, and 4a-iii, it can be easily seen that all
the possible pure equilibria in the respective cases have equal total welfare.
Consequently, the PoA is only as bad as the PoS. Thus, the largest possible
value is achieved for case 4a-i, which is at most
maxtα11`β1,α1`β11u
α11`β11 .
For Case 4a-iv, the pure Nash equilibria of the game are p1, jq, @j P B2
and pi, 1q, @i P B2. It is easy to check that one of them gives the maximum
social welfare, hence PoA for this case is nothing but the ratio of the larger
of the two to the smaller, i.e., maxtα1`βj2
αi2`β1 ,
αi2`β1
α1`βj2 u. The first of the two terms
is at most α1`β1
α11`β1 . The other term is bounded similarly, and so, the PoA is at
most maxtα1`β1
α11`β1 ,
α1`β1
α1`β11 u.
For Case 4b, if pi1, j1q is the only equilibrium, the PoA is simply 1, since this
equilibrium gives the maximum social welfare of αi1 ` βj1 . Although, pj1, i1q
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may also be an equilibrium under the constraints αi1 ą αj1 ě tα1ix , αjyu, @x ě
1, y ě 2, and β1 ą βi1 ě tβ1ix , βjyu, @x ě 1, y ě 2. This other equilibrium has
a social welfare of αj1 ` βi1 “ αi2 ` βj2 . Hence, the PoA is αi1`βj1αi2`βj2 ď
αi1`βj1
α1i1`β1j1
.
Now, this can be compared to all the previous cases, and seen to be worse
than all of them. Finally, we can expand it as,
αi1 ` βj1
α1i1 ` β1j1
“ ~ρ1 ¨ ~v1 ` ~ρ2 ¨ ~v2p~ρ1 d r d ~γq ¨ ~v1 ` p~ρ2 d r d ~γq ¨ ~v2
ď 1
min
1ďjďM rjγj
“ max
1ďjďM
ρ1j ` ρ2j
pρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj .
Again, the inequality follows from Lemma 1. This is the bound we get for
pure PoA.
Further, we show that the PoA at any mixed equilibrium, is no worse than
the bound above for Case 4b. Consider a mixed Nash Equilibrium where
player 1 is randomizing from a set of pure strategies S1, with an expected
payoff P . If i1 P S1, then P equals the expected payoff from playing i1. If
i1 R S1, P is at least the expected payoff from playing i1. Now, the expected
payoff from playing i1 is at least the worst payoff from playing i1, i.e. α
1
i1
.
Thus at any mixed equilibrium, player 1 has a payoff of at least α1i1 . Similarly
player 2 has a payoff of at least β1j1 . Since the maximum social welfare is at
most αi1 ` βj1 , PoA is at most αi1`βi1α1i1`β1j1 , giving us the same bound as above,
thus proving the required result.
Next, we obtain a stronger result, for a special case.
Corollary 2. When the two players have identical sensors and the fusion is
absent, the PoA of the 2-player single-step game is at most at most 2.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 3 by setting ~ρ1 “ ~ρ2 and ~γ “ p1, 1qT .
3.3 Distinct Payoffs and Mixed Equilibria
If multiple strategies can have the same payoffs for a player, the players would
be indifferent among those strategies and this can give rise to a large num-
ber of mixed Nash equilibria. In this section, we show that if we impose an
additional constraint of the information values in all the cells being distinct,
we get interesting results regarding the set of mixed equilibria.
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First, we can truncate the payoff matrix, by observing that all but one strat-
egy corresponding to cells in the unshared space, are strictly dominated by
one of those strategies. Hence, all such strategies can be removed from the
matrix. Wlog, for both the players, let strategy k ` 1 to be this one dom-
inating strategy among those corresponding to the unshared space. When
any player has a dominant strategy, that strategy would be the best response
to any pure or mixed strategy of the opponent. Thus, in such a case, there
cannot be any mixed Nash equilibria. In other cases, there may be many; we
will first show that this number has a small bound.
Theorem 4. The number of mixed equilibria is Opkq.
Proof. Let the α-values of the shared cells in the decreasing order be αi1 ,
αi2 , . . ., αik and similarly, the β-values of the shared cells in the decreasing
order be βj1 , βj2 , . . . , βjk . Consider a mixed Nash equilibrium where, let S1,
S2 denote the sets of pure strategies mixed by the 2 players respectively.
Different pairs of S1, S2 correspond to different equilibria. We first establish
the following lemma:
Lemma 2. @x, y, where, 1 ď x ă y ď k, iy P S1 ñ ix P S2, and jy P S2 ñ
jx P S1
Proof. We have, αix ą αiy . Thus, if player 2 plays ix with 0 probability,
then ix is a strictly better response than iy to any mix of strategies in S2.
Consequently, player 1 will not play iy in its mixed strategy. Thus, iy P S1 ñ
ix P S2. The other implication in the lemma follows similarly.
Now, let il and jm be the strategies in the shared space having the largest
indices in S1, S2 respectively. Hence, S1 Ď ti1, . . . , ilu Y tk ` 1u and S2 Ď
tj1, . . . , jmu Y tk ` 1u. From the lemma above, it follows that il P S1 ñ
ix P S2 @x ă l. Thus, such an equilibrium exists, only if ti1, . . . , il´1u Ď
tj1, . . . , jmu. Similarly, we must have tj1, . . . , jm´1u Ď ti1, . . . , ilu. Thus,
l ´ 1 ď |S2| ď m and m´ 1 ď |S1| ď l. Hence, |l ´m| ď 1. Accordingly, we
have the following cases:
Case 1: l “ m
S1 can have at most l (“ m) strategies, m ´ 1 of which get fixed to be
j1, . . . , jm´1 as shown above. S1 can be formed by including or excluding the
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remaining mth strategy, as well as, by including or excluding k ` 1 i.e. in at
most 4 ways. Similarly S2 can have at most 4 different values. Thus, we can
have at most 16 different pairs (S1, S2).
Case 2: l “ m` 1
We must have ti1, . . . , il´1u “ tj1, . . . , jmu, and by a similar analysis as the
previous case, it is easy to see that S2 can have only two different values
based on whether k` 1 is included or not. S1, on the other hand, has m´ 1
strategies fixed among ti1, . . . , ilu, and thereby, it can have 8 different values
depending on whether each of the remaining two shared-cell strategies as well
as k ` 1 are included or not, and hence, we can have at most 16 different
pairs (S1, S2).
Case 3: m “ l ` 1
Similar to the previous case, there can be at most 16 different pairs (S1, S2).
As l,m can take values from 2 through k, there are roughly 3k pairs (l,m)
such that |l ´m| ď 1. Since the number of different pairs (S1, S2) for each
possible pl,mq is bounded by a constant as shown, the number of different
mixed equilibria is Opkq, thus proving the theorem.
Next, we show that all the mixed equilibria are worse outcomes in terms
of Pareto-dominance as compared to the pure equilibria.
Theorem 5. All the mixed equilibria are Pareto-dominated by the pure equi-
libria.
Proof. As above, consider a mixed Nash equilibrium where, S1, S2 denote
the sets of pure strategies mixed by the two players respectively. In order
for (S1, S2) to correspond to a mixed NE, S1 and S2 must have at least two
strategies each. Hence Dix P S1 s.t. x ě 2. We know that a mix of strategies
in S1 is a best-response iff each pure strategy in S1 is. Hence, the expected
payoff from playing this mixed strategy is same as the expected payoff from
playing ix which is obviously bounded by the best payoff possible by playing
ix which is αix ď αi2 . It is easy to see that player 1’s payoff in all the pure
equilibria is at least αi2 . Similarly, player 2’s payoff from playing the mixed
strategy must be worse than βi2 which is the least payoff of player 2 across all
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the pure equilibria. Thus, playing a mixed strategy gives mutually strictly
worse payoffs. Hence, the mixed equilibria are all Pareto-dominated by the
pure equilibria.
This result implies that, with the assumption that both the agents are self-
interested and aware of the opponent being self-interested, we can conclude
that they would not want to play strategies corresponding to any mixed Nash
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 4
SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION FUSION
The setting of significant fusion is one where sharing a cell gives better pay-
offs than visiting it individually. As mentioned in Section 2, we have assumed
that the fusion process has the properties that, if the fusion gives better pay-
offs, it does so for both the players, in all the cells, and the payoff values
follow the same order as the unshared individual payoff values.
4.1 Existence and Computation of Pure Nash
Equlibrium
We first obtain that the same results hold for the existence and computation
of pure equilibria, as in the moderate fusion case.
Theorem 6. There always exists a pure Nash equilibrium in a 2-player
single-step game with significant fusion and it can be computed in Opnq time
where n is the number of strategies for each player.
Proof. Let i1 and j1 be the respective strategies which correspond to cells
containing the largest amount of information. Let P “ ti : α1i ě αi1u and
Q “ tj : β1j ě βj1u. Note that i ě k ñ i R P and i R Q since α1i and β1i
are not defined for i ě k. One can see that, if P X Q is non-empty, then
@x P P X Q, we have α1x ě αi1 and β1x ě βj1 , and hence, px, xq is a pure
equilibrium.
Case 1: cell1pi1q “ cell2pj1q : In this case , P XQ is necessarily non-empty
since i1p“ j1q must be in P X Q. As pointed above, @x P P X Q, px, xq is
a pure equilibrium. It can be easily shown that there exist no other pure
equilibria.
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Case 2: cell1pi1q ‰ cell2pj1q : In this case, P XQ may or may not be empty.
If i1 P Q or j1 P P , P XQ is necessarily non-empty, and again, @x P P XQ,
px, xq is a pure equilibrium, and these are the only pure equilibria. On the
other hand, if i1 R Q and j1 R P , pi1, j1q is a Nash equilibrium. Additionally,
P X Q may still be non-empty, and if it is, @x P P X Q, px, xq is a pure
equilibrium.
Thus, even in the case of significant fusion, there always exists a pure NE.
Further, it is straight-forward to see that computing i1, j1, and subsequently,
computing P and Q can be done in Opnq time and hence this is no worse
than the case with no fusion.
Next, we establish bounds on the PoS and the PoA in this setting.
4.2 Social Welfare
As done for the moderate fusion case, we first establish an upper bound on
the pure PoS.
Theorem 7. The pure PoS of the 2-player single-step game with significant
fusion, is at most
1` max
1ďjďM
maxtρ1j, ρ2juppρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj ´ pρ1j ` ρ2jqq
pρ1j ` ρ2jq2 .
Proof. We prove this by analyzing the various cases formulated in the proof
of Theorem 6.
For Case 1, one can see that the strategy px, xq for any x P P X Q gives
mutually better payoffs than any px, yq for x ‰ y. Thus, the maximum social
welfare is achieved for one of these, all of which are equilibria. Hence, the
PoS is simply 1.
In Case 2, if P X Q is non-empty, again, the maximum social welfare for
is achieved at px, xq for some x P P X Q, which is an equilibrium. Hence,
the PoS is simply 1. However, P XQ may be empty, and pi1, j1q maybe the
only equilibrium. In that case, better social welfare maybe achieved at some
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px, xq in P YQ. Thus, the PoS is at most α1x`β1x
αi1`βj1 . We can then write,
α1x ` β1x
αi1 ` βj1 ď
maxtα1i1 ` βj1 , αi1 ` β1j1u
αi1 ` βj1 “ 1` maxiPt1,2u
p~ρi d ~r d ~γ ´ ~ρiq ¨ ~v
p~ρ1 ` ~ρ2q ¨ ~v
“ 1` max
1ďjďM
maxtρ1j, ρ2juppρ1j ` ρ2j ´ ρ1jρ2jqγj ´ pρ1j ` ρ2jqq
pρ1j ` ρ2jq2 .
This gives us the desired bound.
Next, we similarly obtain an upper bound on PoA.
Theorem 8. The PoA of the 2-player single-step game with significant fu-
sion, is at most
p1´ ρ1jρ2j
ρ1j ` ρ2j qγj.
Proof. We first prove the bound on pure PoA by analyzing the various cases
formulated in the proof of Theorem 6.
For Case 1, px, xq for every x P PXQ is an equilibrium. As shown earlier, the
maximum social welfare is achieved for one of these. Hence, the minimum of
these leads to the worst PoA, that is,
max
xPPXQα
1
x ` β1x
min
xPPXQα
1
x ` β1x ď
α1i1 ` β1j1
αi1 ` βj1 ď max1ďjďMp1´
ρ1jρ2j
ρ1j ` ρ2j qγj.
In Case 2, if P X Q is non-empty, again, the maximum social welfare is
achieved at px, xq for some x P P XQ. Further, it is easy to see that any such
equilibrium gives a social welfare of α1x ` β1x, which is better than αi1 ` βj1
due to the fact that x P P X Q. This makes pi1, j1q the worst equilib-
rium. Hence, the PoA is α
1
x`β1x
αi1`βj1 ď
α1i1`β1j1
αi1`βj1 , thus giving the same bound as
above. On the other hand, if P X Q is empty, then pi1, j1q is the only equi-
librium. Consequently, the PoA is only as bad as the PoS, which is at most
maxtα1i1`βj1 ,αi1`β1j1u
αi1`βj1 as analyzed in proving Theorem 7. Again it can be easily
seen that this is no worse than
α1i1`β1j1
αi1`βj1 , which is the bound for the previous
cases.
Finally, we show that the same bound applies to the mixed equilibria. The
payoff of player 1 must be at least the payoff it would get by switching to
pure strategy i1. The minimum value of the latter is simply αi1 . Similarly,
the payoff of player 2 from any mixed strategy, must be at least βj1 . Thus,
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the worst social welfare at any mixed equilibrium is αi1 ` βj1 , whereas the
maximum possible is nothing but α1i1 ` β1j1 , thus giving us the same bound
of
α1i1`β1j1
αi1`βj1 as the pure PoA.
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CHAPTER 5
MULTI-PLAYER GAME: CORRELATED
SETTING
In this section, we consider a more general scenario consisting of p players
(UAVs), albeit with the constraint of their payoffs being correlated. Formally,
we have a set of players P “ t1, . . . , pu. Player i has a sensor effectiveness
ρi. The region of surveillance consists of a set of cells C “ tc1, . . . , cku.
If a set of players S choose a certain cell c P C having information vpcq,
the aggregate payoff is given by γ|S|
ˆ
1´ś
iPS
p1´ ρiq
˙
vpcq. Further, each
player i P S, gets an individual share of the payoff proportional to its ρi,
i.e. ρiř
iPS
ρi
γ|S|
ˆ
1´ś
iPS
p1´ ρiq
˙
v. This can be written in a general form of
ρiMcpSq, where Mc for each cell c, is a function Mc : 2P Ñ R. It is easy to
see, that for our game, McpSq “ γ|S|
ˆ
1´ś
iPS
p1´ρiq
˙
ř
iPS
ρi
vpcq. For our next result,
however, we do not need this explicit definition of Mc and we will show that
our result holds true for a certain class of functions in general.
5.1 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium
First, we state the Finite Improvement Property (FIP) [24]: Any sequence
of strategy-tuples in which each strategy-tuple differs from the preceding
one in only one coordinate (such a sequence is called a path), and the unique
deviator in each step strictly increases the payoff it receives (an improvement
path), is finite. Obviously, any maximal improvement path, is terminated by
an equilibrium.
Next, we state a natural monotonicity definition for functions defined on sets:
Definition 3. Let A be a set. A function f : 2A Ñ R is monotonically
non-decreasing, if @A1, A2 Ď A,A1 Ď A2 ñ fpA1q ď fpA2q. Similarly, f is
monotonically non-increasing, if A1 Ď A2 ñ fpA1q ě fpA2q.
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Next, we prove the existence of a pure equilibrium by showing that the
game admits the finite improvement property.
Theorem 9. If the function tMc|c P Cu are all monotonically non-increasing,
or all monotonically non-decreasing functions, then the game admits the Fi-
nite Improvement Property.
Proof. To prove this, we extend the argument used in [17] — which is used
there for proving the FIP for symmetric congestion games. Suppose, for the
sake of proving contradiction, that there is an infinite improvement path.
Since there are only finitely many joint strategies, this essentially means
that there is an improvement cycle, say, of size l, given by σ1, σ2, . . . , σl, σ1,
where, σj is the joint-strategy in the j
th step. Further, let Sjpcq denote the
set of players going to cell c in the jth step. Let C# Ď C denote the set
tc | Di, j, Sipcq ‰ Sjpcqu, i.e., those cells which are not occupied by the same
set of players throughout the whole improvement cycle. First, we prove for
the case where tMc|c P Cu are all monotonically non-increasing.
Wlog, suppose the improvement cycle and the cells, are enumerated such
that min
1ďjďl,cPC#
McpSjpcqq “ Mc1pSlpc1qq. Now, since c1 P C#, Dj such that
Sjpc1q ‰ Slpc1q. Consider largest such j, i.e. Sj`1pc1q “ Slpc1q. Since, each
Mc is monotonically non-increasing, and since the minimum value of Mc1 is
attained for Slpc1q, thus, also for Sj`1pc1q, it follows that Sjpc1q Ă Sj`1pc1q,
Thus, the unique deviator between σj and σj`1, wlog say player 1, must be
changing his strategy to c1 from some other cell ci, say. Thus, ci P C#, and
further, for this deviation to be an improvement for Player 1, it must be that
ρ1McipSjpciqq ă ρ1Mc1pSj`1pc1qq, and hence, McipSjpciqq ă Mc1pSj`1pc1qq “
Mc1pSlpc1qq. This contradicts the assumption that, min
1ďjďl,cPC#
McpSjpcqq “
Mc1pSlpc1qq, and consequently, there cannot exist an improvement cycle, thus
proving the finite improvement property.
The case where tMc|c P Cu are all monotonically non-decreasing, can be
shown similarly. Wlog, suppose the improvement cycle and the cells, are enu-
merated such that max
1ďjďl,cPC#
McpSjpcqq “ Mc1pS1pc1qq. Now, since c1 P C#,
Dj such that Sjpc1q ‰ S1pc1q. Consider the smallest such j, i.e. Sj´1pc1q “
S1pc1q. Since, every Mc is monotonically non-decreasing, and since the min-
imum value of Mc1 is attained for S1pc1q, thus, also for Sj´1pc1q, it follows
that Sjpc1q Ă Sj´1pc1q, Thus, the unique deviator between σj´1 and σj,
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wlog, player 1, must be changing his strategy to c1 from some other cell,
say ci. Thus, ci P C#, and further, for this deviation to be an improve-
ment for player 1, it must be that ρ1McipSjpciqq ą ρ1Mc1pSj´1pc1qq, and
hence, McipSjpciqq ą Mc1pSj´1pc1qq “ Mc1pS1pc1qq. This contradicts the as-
sumption that, max
1ďjďl,cPC#
McpSjpcqq “ Mc1pS1pc1qq, and consequently, there
cannot exist an improvement cycle, thus proving the Finite improvement
property.
In our UAV game, it is intuitive to see that if there is no fusion, each Mc is
a non-increasing function since sharing a cell with an additional player should
decrease payoff — a rigorous proof is given by Lemma 11 in the appendix. In
general, whenever the fusion parameters γl are small enough so that Mc are
all non-increasing functions, which is the case of Moderate Fusion. On the
other hand, when γl are large enough so that every Mc is a non-decreasing
function, it is the case of Significant Fusion. The theorem above, implies
that, in the cases of moderate fusion and significant fusion, there always
exists a pure Nash equilibrium.
Next, we give an algorithm to efficiently compute a pure equilibrium, in
the case of Significant Fusion.
5.2 Computing a Pure Nash Equilibrium for
Significant Fusion
The case of significant fusion is when, more the number of UAVs in the same
cell, larger is the individual payoff for each UAV there. That is, @S Ă P, p P
P zS, i P S, c P C, we have ρiMcpSq ď ρiMcpS Y tpuq. We use a function
A : C Ñ P to denote the set of players which can access a given cell in one
step.
The algorithm consists of a number of iterations. Starting with the set
of all players, and the set of all cells, in each iteration, some players are
assigned a particular cell as their strategy to play and the set of remaining
players and the set of remaining cells is carried forward to the next iteration.
In each iteration i, for each cell c in Ci, we compute McpApcq X P iq, where
P i is the set of remaining players in that iteration, and Ci is the set of
remaining cells. Then, we choose the cell cmaxi for which the value thus
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computed is maximum, and assign this cell as the strategy for all the players
in Apcmaxi qXP i. Subsequently, we update the set of remaining players P i`1 “
P izpApcmaxi q X P iq and Ci`1 “ Ciztcmaxi u and move on to the next iteration.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to compute a pure NE
1: P 1 Ð P , C1 Ð C, iÐ 1
2: while P i ‰ φ do Ź Terminate if no players remaining
3: cmaxi Ð Null, maxScoreÐ ´8
4: for c P Ci do
5: Qipcq “ Apcq X P i
6: scoreÐMcpQipcqq
7: if score ą maxScore then
8: maxScoreÐ score, cmaxi Ð c
9: end if
10: end for Ź cmaxi is computed.
11: for p P Qipcmaxi q do
12: Assign cell cmaxi to p
13: end for
14: P i`1 “ P izQipcmaxi q
15: Ci`1 “ Ciztcmaxi u
16: iÐ i` 1
17: end while
Proof of Correctness :
Wlog, let the cells be enumerated such that @i, cmaxi “ ci. We first note that
i ă j ô P j Ă P i ñ Qjpcjq Ď Qipcjq. Now, Suppose player 1 is assigned the
cell ci by the algorithm. Hence, 1 R Apcjq, @j ă i, since otherwise, it would
have been assigned a cell before the ith iteration. Thus, the only cells player
1 could possibly move to, are tcjująi. The payoff of player 1 before devia-
tion, by playing ci, is ρ1McipQipciqq, which is at least ρ1McjpQipcjqq, since
cmaxi “ ci. Further, @j ą i, 1 P Apcjq ñ 1 P Qipcjq. This further implies that
since Qjpcjq Ď Qipcjq, it must also be that, pQjpcjq Y t1uq Ď Qipcjq, when-
ever 1 can access cj. Hence, by the monotonically non-decreasing behavior
of each Mc, Player 1’s payoff after deviation to cj, i.e., ρ1McjpQjpcjq Y 1q, is
at most ρ1McjpQipcjqq, which is at most its payoff before deviation. Hence,
it has no incentive to switch, and the same applies to all the players. Hence,
the algorithm does produce a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to check that the
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algorithm takes time Op|C| ¨ |P |q.
Next, we establish bounds on the Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy,
when all players are identical.
5.3 PoS and PoA for Homogeneous Fleet
Having a homogeneous fleet refers to all the UAVs having identical sensor
effectiveness ρ. In such a case, the payoff of a player simply depends on the
number of players it shares a cell with, and not the actual subset of players.
We denote the individual payoff of a player when n players share a cell c, by
vnpcq “ vpcq1´p1´ρqn
n
. Our result is as follows:
Theorem 10. The Price of Stability and the Price of Anarchy, in singleton
congestion games with payoffs defined as above, is at most 2´ 1{p.
Proof. Let σeq be an equilibrium and let σwf be a joint strategy which gives
the maximum social welfare. Suppose, starting with σeq, σwf is achieved
by a series of deviations, where each deviation refers to a player switching
from a cell ci to a cell cj. Since the players are identical, only the cells
involved in a deviation matter, and not the player who deviates. Thus, these
deviations can be represented by a directed graph over the cells, where each
cell is a vertex and a deviation from one cell to another is represented as a
directed edge. Note that since only the number of players in a cell matters in
computing any payoffs, any path in the graph of length more than 1, between
nodes u and v say, can simply be replaced by a single edge pu, vq, since both
of them equivalently result in the number of players at cell u decreasing by
1, the number of players at cell v increasing by 1, and any other cells on the
path being unaffected. Thus, any graph G can be reduced to G˚, one which
doesn’t have any paths of length more than 1, and similarly no cycles. Thus,
the reduced graph will only have sources, sinks and isolated vertices. Figure
1 illustrates this with an example. Vertices such as c3 with a larger in-degree
than out-degree in G become sinks in G˚. Similarly, vertices like c1 having a
larger out-degree in G become sources in G˚, and the remaining ones like c7
where the two degrees are equal in G, become isolated in G˚. Now, consider
the group of players who are in a cell c at equilibrium. We consider three
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Figure 1: Reduction of a deviation graph
cases for c:
1. c is an isolated vertex in G˚: It is easy to see that the payoff of every
player here remains the same.
2. c is a sink in G˚: Thus, there are at least as many players in c at σwf ,
as there were at the equilibrium σeq. Hence, the payoff of these players is
bounded above by their payoff at the equilibrium.
3. c is a source in G˚: Consider a player i who is in cell c at σeq, and is in
c1 at σwf . By the nature of G˚, c1 must be a sink in G˚. Hence, there are at
least as many players in c1 at σwf , as there were at σeq. Thus, if player i were
to be the unique deviator at equilibrium from c to c1, it would have gotten at
least as much a payoff as it gets by playing c1 at σwf . Further, since σeq is an
equilibrium, the payoff of player i at σeq is at least as much as it would get
by deviating to any other cell, in particular c1, and in turn, greater than its
payoff at σwf . Now, suppose there were x players in cell c at σeq, of which y
are not in c at σwf , while x´ y players continue to be in c at σwf . Then, the
payoffs of the y deviating players, at σwf is at most as much as their payoff
at σeq, i.e. vpcq1´p1´ρqx
x
. The payoff of any of the remaining x ´ y players,
improves from vpcq1´p1´ρqx
x
to vpcq1´p1´ρqx´y
x´y . Hence, if all the players leave,
i.e., y “ x, the total welfare of this group of x players cannot increase. On
the other hand, if y ă x, the total social welfare for this group of players,
can increase by a factor of at most
p1´p1´ρqx´yq`yp1´p1´ρqxq{x
1´p1´ρqx . It can be easily
shown that this expression is a monotonically increasing function of ρ for
ρ P p0, 1s and has the maximum value of 1 ` y{x when ρ “ 1. Further, it is
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easy to see that the maximum value of 1 ` y{x, for y ă x ď p is 2 ´ 1{p,
which is achieved for x “ p, y “ p´ 1. Thus, the maximum possible gain in
the total welfare of this group is when all but one players leave the cell.
Thus, for a group of players which are in a particular cell at equilibrium,
the sum of their payoffs either remains the same, decreases, or increases by
a factor of at most 2 ´ 1{p as analyzed for the three cases above. Hence,
the total social welfare of all the players, which is the sum of welfares of
all such groups, can increase by a factor of at most as much as any of the
individual groups, which is nothing but 2´1{p, giving us the required bound.
(Note that the analysis above holds for any equilibrium, and thus, the worst
equilibrium in particular, giving the bound on PoA.)
Further, this bound can be shown to be tight for the Price of Stability as
well, with a simple example. Let there be p players with ρ “ 1 for each
player. Let there be p cells with every cell being a valid strategy for every
player. Let the information available in various cells be as follows : vpc1q “
p, vpcq “ 1´  @c ‰ c1;  ą 0. It is easy to see that c1 is a dominant strategy
for every player, giving a unique equilibrium pc1, . . . , c1q. The total social
welfare here is p. It is easy to see that the social welfare is maximum for the
joint strategy pc1, c2, . . . , cpq which equals p`pp´ 1qp1´ q. Hence the Price
of stability is 1` p1´ 1{pqp1´ q which approaches 2´ 1{p as Ñ 0.
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CHAPTER 6
MULTI-STEP GAME
We model the problem of UAV surveillance as a game between the UAVs.
We formulate two different games having a vital distinction, in the following
setting. P is a finite set of p players, each corresponding to a UAV. The
geographical region of surveillance is represented as a directed graph, where
C, the set of vertices - more commonly referred to as cells - represent various
small sub-regions, and the directed edges of the graph capture the connectiv-
ity between these cells. Moving along any edge and surveilling the subsequent
cell altogether corresponds to one time-step. The number of time-steps for
which the game lasts is denoted by l. The game is for each player to move
in this network for l time-steps, while capturing the information from the
cells visited along the route, with the goal of maximizing this information
captured. Thus, the set of strategies for player i, denoted by Si, is nothing
but a set of walks of length l starting from player i’s initial cell. The set of
‘joint strategy profiles’, or simply ‘outcomes’, is denoted by S “Ś
iPP
Si. Each
cell has an associated information value denoted by a function v : C Ñ R`.
Each player i P P has a sensor effectiveness denoted by ρi P r0, 1s, which de-
termines how much information the player can collect from what is available
in the cell it visits. Finally, the payoff of a player depends on the outcome,
and is denoted by pii : S Ñ R` for every player i. The net payoff of a player
is the sum of the payoffs it gets by visiting the cells on its walk. With a
slight abuse of notation, we denote player i’s payoff from cell c P C, when
the outcome is s P S, by piips, cq, so that piipsq “ ř
cPC
piips, cq. We naturally
define piips, cq to be zero if i does not visit c at all when playing si. However,
when it does visit the cell (possibly more than once), the value piips, cq can
be defined in two different ways depending on the logistics of the real-world
scenario, giving rise to two different games as follows:
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With temporal aspect: In this case, any player gets an instant payoff
after visiting a cell (in a manner described below), and these payoffs get
accumulated constituting its net payoff. Consider a cell c initially having a
value vpcq. The first player to visit c, say player 1, gets a payoff ρ1vpcq, and we
say that the value left in c is p1´ρ1qvpcq. Similarly, each player i, on visiting
a cell c, gets a payoff that is ρi fraction of the value left in c at the time of
its visit, leaving behind p1 ´ ρiq fraction of that value. Thus, if a sequence
of k players say px1, x2, . . . , xkq visit c one after the other, then the ith visitor
xi gets a payoff of ρxi
˜ś
jăi
p1´ ρxjq
¸
vpcq corresponding to that visit; if the
same player is also the jth visitor for some j ‰ i, it will get a payoff for each
such visit defined similarly. The combined payoff of all these players, from
visiting c is ˜
1´
ź
jďk
p1´ ρxjq
¸
vpcq. (1)
Note that this combined payoff is independent of the order of the players.
Thereby, if tx1, x2, . . . , xku is a set of players visiting c simultaneously, that
is, in the same time-step, then we say that they altogether capture the same
amount of information as they would if they visit it one after the other in
some order, and further, we define the payoff of player xi as the share of this
combined payoff proportional to ρxi . Thus, this is equal to
ρxiř
jďk
ρxj
˜
1´
ź
jďk
p1´ ρxjq
¸
vpcq. (2)
Thus, the payoff of a player from a visit to a cell depends on which players
visit the cell before it and which players visit simultaneously.
Without temporal aspect: In this case, the payoff from visiting a cell is
determined at the end of the game, regardless of the order in which the players
visit the cell. Since the order is immaterial, we can represent the visitors of a
cell c as a multiset, say P 1, having support in P and an associated multiplicity
function denoted by mP 1p¨q. In case of no ambiguity, we drop the subscript
and denote the multiplicity function as simply mp¨q. The payoff of a visitor
from a single visit is precisely as in (2), and thus with possibly multiple visits,
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the payoff of player i P P 1 is given by
ρi mpiqř
jPP 1
ρj mpjq
˜
1´
ź
jPP 1
p1´ ρjqmpjq
¸
vpcq. (3)
Next, we establish results for both these games on existence of pure equilibria,
bound on PoA etc. For the latter, we establish the smoothness of these games,
which is defined as follows [25]:
Definition 4. (λ, µ)–smoothness: A payoff-maximization game — one
where each player has a payoff function piipsq that it strives to maximize —
is called (λ, µ)–smooth if
@s, s˚ P S,
ÿ
iPP
piips˚i , s´iq ě λ
ÿ
iPP
piips˚q ´ µ
ÿ
iPP
piipsq. (4)
We first analyze the game with temporal aspect.
6.1 Multi-step Game with Temporal Aspect
In this section, we analyze the game with temporal aspect. As discussed
before, the payoff of a player from visiting a cell is not merely dependent
on which players visit the cell, but also on the order in which they visit
the cell. The combined payoff, however, when a sequence of players visit
a cell c (some of them possibly simultaneously), does not depend on their
order, and can be easily computed as in (2). Let A, B be multisets with
support in P , with mA, mB the respective multiplicity functions, and for a
cell c, let piABpcq denote the combined payoff which the visitors in B would
obtain by visiting cell c (as many times as the respective multiplicities in
B), when preceded by all (and only) the visitors as represented by A. Note
that the multiset-representation is sufficient for this to be well-defined, since
the order of visitors in A among themselves, and similarly that of visitors
in B among themselves, does not matter when computing the said combined
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payoff. Indeed, the exact expression can be easily obtained to be
piABpcq “
˜
1´
ź
jPB
p1´ ρjqmBpjq
¸ź
jPA
p1´ ρjqmApjqvpcq. (5)
Here, the entity
ś
jPA
p1 ´ ρjqmApjq denotes the fraction of vpcq left in c after
visitors in A have visited, and the fraction of it collected by B is computed
similarly.
With this notation, the following observations are immediate:
Lemma 3. Let A,B,D be multisets with support in P. Then, piABpcq `
piAZBD pcq “ piABZDpcq.
Proof. Note that BZD is the multiset sum of B and D and thus represents
the combined visitors in B as well as D. Thus, the result follows from the
definition of piABpcq, as both the sides equal the combined payoff of visitors in
B and D when they are preceded by visitors in A.
Lemma 4. Let A,B,B1 be multisets with support in P s.t. B1 Ď B. Then,
piAB1pcq ď piABpcq.
Proof. Applying Lemma 3 onA,B1, BzB1 respectively, we get, piABpcq´piAB1pcq “
piAZB
1
BzB1 pcq ě 0. Rearranging gives the required result.
Lemma 5. Let A,A1, B be multisets with support in P s.t. A1 Ď A. Then,
piABpcq ď piA1B pcq.
Proof. Using (5), it is easy to see that piABpcq{piA1B pcq “
ś
jPAzA1
p1´ρjqmApjq´mA1 pjq ď
1. Rearranging gives the required result.
Next, suppose c is a cell, and A is a multiset with support in P . For each
player j, let S 1j Ď Sj denote the subset of strategies of player j in which j
visits c exactly mApjq times. Then, S 1 “ Ś
j
S 1j is the set of outcomes for
which the multiset A precisely captures which players visit cell c and how
often. In case of such an outcome, we refer to A as the visitor set for c. Also,
for any multiset A and a player i P A, let A|i denote the multiset mApiqbtiu,
i.e. A|i only contains i — with the same multiplicity as A — and let A|´i
denote the multiset AzAi. We now show another important result.
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Lemma 6. Let A be any multiset with support in P, and let i P A. Let c be
any cell and let S 1 Ď S be the set of outcomes for which A is the visitor set
for c. Then,
@s P S 1, piips, cq ě piA|´iA|i pcq.
In other words, keeping the visitor set of a cell fixed, the payoff of a player
from all its visits to the cell is no worse than the payoff it would get when all
its visits are preceded by all the other visitors in the visitor set. While the
result appears very intuitive, a rigorous proof can be found in the appendix.
Using these, we now show that this game is (1,1)–smooth. Let s and s˚
be any two outcomes. For every player i, let qi denote the outcome psi˚ , s´iq.
For any cell c, let multisets Ac, and Ac˚ denote the visitor sets for cell c when
the outcomes are s, s˚ respectively. Note that when the outcome is qi, the
visitor set of cell c can be written as Ac˚ |i Z Ac|´i. With this notation, we
can write, ÿ
iPP
piipsq “
ÿ
iPP
ÿ
cPC
piips, cq
“
ÿ
cPC
ÿ
iPP
piips, cq
“
ÿ
cPC
piHAcpcq. (6)
similarly, we have, ÿ
iPP
piips˚q “
ÿ
cPC
piHAc˚ pcq. (7)
Finally, for the outcomes qi, we can write,ÿ
iPP
piipqiq “
ÿ
iPP
ÿ
cPC
piipqi, cq
“
ÿ
cPC
ÿ
iPP
piipqi, cq. (8)
Now, if player i does not visit cell c when playing strategy si˚ , equivalently,
if it is not contained in the visitor set Ac˚ , its payoff from visiting c is simply
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zero. Thus, (8) becomes,
ÿ
iPP
piipqiq “
ÿ
cPC
ÿ
iPAc˚
piipqi, cq
ě
ÿ
cPC
ÿ
iPAc˚
piAc|´iAc˚ |i pcq. (9)
Here, (9) follows from Lemma 6. Finally, adding (6) and (9) and subtracting
(7) gives,
ÿ
iPP
piipqiq `
ÿ
iPP
piipsq ´
ÿ
iPP
piips˚q ě
ÿ
cPC
¨˝
piHAcpcq `
ÿ
iPAc˚
piAc|´iAc˚ |i pcq ´ pi
H
Ac˚
pcq‚˛.
(10)
Now, we show that each term of the summation on the R.H.S of (10) is
always non-negative, via the following lemma:
Lemma 7. For a cell c P C, let A and A˚ be the visitor sets of c for outcomes
s, s˚ P S respectively. Then,
piHA pcq `
ÿ
iPA˚
piA|´iA˚|i pcq ě piHA˚pcq. (11)
Proof. Included in the Appendix.
Thus, it follows from (11) and (10) that,
ÿ
iPP
piipqiq `
ÿ
iPP
piipsq ´
ÿ
iPP
piips˚q ě 0ÿ
iPP
piipqiq `
ÿ
iPP
piipsq ě
ÿ
iPP
piips˚q.
Thus, by Definition 4, we have the desired result:
Theorem 11. The multi-step game with temporal aspect is p1, 1q–smooth.
As shown in [25], a pλ, µq–smooth payoff-maximization game has a price
of anarchy at most 1`µ
λ
, and this bound applies to the PoA with respect to
all equilibrium concepts(mixed, correlated and not just pure. Thus,
Corollary 3. The multi-step game with temporal aspect has a price of anar-
chy at most 2.
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Thus, the game has a constant PoA bound independent of the number
of players, number of time-steps. We now show with an example, that this
bound is tight.
Figure 2: A 2-player game with temporal aspect. The only equilibrium has
a social welfare of 1, the maximum possible being 2-.
Consider the game as shown in Figure 2. Let the number of time-steps
be lpě 2q. The graph is a simple path as shown with cells ci and ci`1 being
neighbors of each other for each i. Initially, the information in all the cells
is 0, except for cl and c2l - these 2 cells have an information of 1 and 1 ´ 
respectively, where  is a small positive constant. There are two players with
sensor effectiveness ρ1 “ ρ2 “ 1, initially in cells c0 and c2l´1 respectively.
Now, player 2 cannot grab information from both cl and c2l within l time-
steps. Further, it follows that the path c2l´1 Ñ c2l´2 Ñ . . . Ñ cl Ñ cl´1 is
a dominant strategy for player 2, in which case it gets a payoff of 1 and in
response, player 1 gets 0 from any strategy. Clearly, this is a pure equilibrium,
leading to a social welfare of 1. On the other hand, if player 2 captures
information from (only) c2l allowing player 1 to capture from cl which it can
reach in the lth time-step, then the social welfare can reach its maximum
value of 2´ . Since there is only 1 equilibrium, the PoS, as well as the PoA
for this game is 2´ , i.e., it approaches 2 as  approaches 0. Thus, we have,
Theorem 12. The multi-step game with temporal aspect has a PoS and PoA
of 2.
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Figure 3: Counter-example where pure NE does not exist (Game with
temporal aspect)
6.1.1 Non-existence of Pure NE
Unlike the single-step game, the general multi-step game may not always
have a pure Nash Equilibrium, as demonstrated by the following example.
Consider the game as shown in Figure 3. The connectivity between cells is
given by the directed edges and the information initially available in each
cell is shown. The number of time-steps is 4. Players 1 and 2, with sensor
effectiveness ρ1 “ ρ2 “ 1 are initially in cells P and Q respectively. Thus,
Player 1 has two strategies - paths P Ñ A Ñ C Ñ E Ñ D and P Ñ A Ñ
B Ñ D Ñ E. Let these be called ‘Left’ and ’Right’ respectively. Player
2 similarly has 2 strategies, say ‘Up’ and ’Down’ corresponding to paths
Q Ñ U Ñ V Ñ B Ñ D and Q Ñ K Ñ L Ñ M Ñ N . Then, the payoff
matrix is given by,
« Up Down
Left p50, 25q p60, 8q
Right p55, 0q p55, 8q
ff
It is easy to check, that there is no pure equilibrium in this case.
6.2 Multi-step Game without Temporal Aspect
In this section, we analyze the game without temporal aspect. When there
is no temporal aspect, the payoff of a player from a visit to a cell is merely
dependent on which players visit the cell over the complete course of the
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game and how many times, regardless of the order in which they visit the
cell. Thereby, the combined payoff of players from their visits to a cell c
(some of them possibly simultaneously), also does not depend on the order
of visits, and can be easily computed using (3). Owing to the different
setting in this game than the one with temporal aspect, we opt for a slightly
different notation. Let A, B be multisets with support in P , with mA, mB
the respective multiplicity functions, such that B Ď A. Then, for a cell c, let
θABpcq denote the combined payoff which the visitors in B would obtain by
visiting cell c (as many times as the respective multiplicities in B), when the
complete set of visitors for c is given by A. Naturally, this is only meaningful
when B Ď A. With this notation, the following observations are immediate,
and principally analogous to Lemma 3, 4, 5 respectively.
Lemma 8. Let A,B,D be multisets with support in P s.t. B Z D Ď A.
Then, θABpcq ` θADpcq “ θABZDpcq.
Proof. Follows from definition, as both sides equal the combined payoff of
visitors in B and D when the complete set of visitors is given by A.
Lemma 9. Let A,B,B1 be multisets with support in P s.t. B1 Ď B Ď A.
Then, θAB1pcq ď θABpcq.
Proof. Applying Lemma 8 onA,B1, BzB1 respectively, we get, θABpcq´θAB1pcq “
θABzB1pcq ě 0. Rearranging gives the required result.
Lemma 10. Let A be a multiset with support in P, and i be any player.
Then, θAA|ipcq ě piA|´iA|i pcq.
Proof. Note that in a game with temporal aspect, in the case when the visitor
set of a cell c is A, one possible outcome s corresponds to all the visitors in A
visiting in the same time-step, and thus, θAA|ipcq is a possible payoff of player i
from cell c when its visitor set is fixed to A. Consequently, the result follows
from Lemma 6.
To show smoothness for this game, we proceed similarly as in the game
with temporal aspect. Let s and s˚ be any two outcomes. For every player i,
let qi denote the outcome ps˚i, s´iq. For any cell c, let multisets Ac, and Ac˚
denote the visitor sets for cell c when the outcomes are s, and s˚ respectively.
Analogous to (6), (7), and (9), we can write,
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ÿ
iPP
piipsq “
ÿ
cPC
θAcAc pcq, (12)ÿ
iPP
piips˚q “
ÿ
cPC
θAc˚Ac˚ pcq, (13)ÿ
iPP
piipqiq “
ÿ
cPC
ÿ
iPAc˚
θAc|´iZAc˚ |iAc˚ |i pcq. (14)
Next, adding (12) and (14) and subtracting (13) gives,
ÿ
iPP
piipqiq `
ÿ
iPP
piipsq ´
ÿ
iPP
piips˚q ě
ÿ
cPC
¨˝
θAcAc pcq `
ÿ
iPAc˚
θAc|´iZAc˚ |iAc˚ |i pcq ´ θ
Ac˚
Ac˚
pcq‚˛.
(15)
Finally, note that θAcAcpcq “ piHAcpcq and θAc˚Ac˚ pcq “ pi
H
Ac˚
pcq by definition. Further,
applying Lemma 10 on Ac|´i ZAc˚ |i, we get, θAc|´iZAc˚ |iAc˚ |i pcq ě pi
Ac|´i
Ac˚ |i pcq. With
this, (15) becomes,
ÿ
iPP
piipqiq `
ÿ
iPP
piipsq ´
ÿ
iPP
piips˚q ě
ÿ
cPC
¨˝
piHAcpcq `
ÿ
iPAc˚
piAc|´iAc˚ |i pcq ´ pi
H
Ac˚
pcq‚˛.
(16)
As seen in the previous section, the RHS of (16) is non-negative by Lemma
7, and in turn, so is the LHS, thus proving the desired result:
Theorem 13. The multi-step game without temporal aspect is (1, 1)-smooth.
Again, using the result in [25] as mentioned in the previous section, we
have,
Corollary 4. The multi-step game without temporal aspect has a price of
anarchy at most 2.
Next, we demonstrate the tightness of this bound via an example.
Consider the game as shown in Figure 4. The set of players is t1, . . . , pu,
with ρ1 “ ρ2 “ . . . “ ρp “ 1. The number of time-steps is l. The cells in
the network and the connectivity among them is as shown. The information
initially available in cell c is 1, while in cells c2l , . . . c
p
l , it is v “ lpp´1ql`1 ´ 
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Figure 4: A game without temporal aspect where PoA can get arbitrarily
close to 2 with a high number of players and number of time-steps
where  is a small positive constant. The information available is 0 in all other
cells. Player 1 is initially in cell c1l´1, while every other player i ą 1 is initially
in cell ci0. Now, the only strategy for player 1 is the path c
1
l´1 Ñ c1l´2 Ñ . . .Ñ
c10 Ñ c. Now, the outcome where every other player i ą 1, plays the strategy
ci0 Ñ cÑ cÑ . . .Ñ cÑ c gives every player i ą 1, a payoff which evaluates
to lpp´1ql`1 . Thus, no player i wants to deviate to the other possible strategy
ci0 Ñ ci1 Ñ . . . Ñ cil as it gives a smaller payoff of lpp´1ql`1 ´ . Thus, the
aforesaid outcome is a pure Nash Equilibrium, which has a social welfare of
1. However, it can be seen that the social welfare increases as more and more
players switch to the respective alternative strategy, and in the extreme case
of every player i ą 1 switching to the respective strategy ci0 Ñ ci1 Ñ . . .Ñ cil,
the social welfare reaches the maximum value of 2´ 1pp´1ql`1´pp´1q, giving
the same value of PoA. Thus, as  Ñ 0, it approaches 2 ´ 1pp´1ql`1 , which
in turn, can become arbitrarily close to 2 if the parameters p or l become
arbitrarily large, showing that the bound of 2 is tight.
6.2.1 Non-existence of Pure NE
Unlike the single-step game, the general multi-step game without temporal
aspect may not always have a pure Nash Equilibrium, as demonstrated by
the following example.
Consider the game as shown in Figure 5. The connectivity between cells
is given by the directed edges and the information initially available in each
cell is shown. The number of time-steps is 3. Players 1 and 2, with sensor
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Figure 5: Counter-example where pure NE does not exist (Game without
temporal aspect)
effectiveness ρ1 “ ρ2 “ 0.8 are initially in cells P and Q respectively. Thus,
Player 1 has two strategies: paths P Ñ A1 Ñ A2 Ñ A and P Ñ B1 Ñ
B2 Ñ B. Let these be called ‘sA’ and ‘sB’ respectively. Player 2 has 8
strategies, however, since the sequence of the visits does not matter, there
are 4 distinct ones. Let these be called ‘A3B0’ ,‘A2B1’ ,‘A1B2’ ,‘A0B3’, where
‘AiBj’ denotes a strategy which visits A i times and B j times. Then, the
payoff matrix for this game is given by,
« A3B0 A2B1 A1B2 A0B3
SA p0.2496, 0.7488q p0.3307, 1.4613q p0.4800, 1.4400q p0.8000, 0.9920q
SB p0.8000, 0.9920q p0.4800, 1.4400q p0.3307, 1.4613q p0.2496, 0.7488q
ff
It is easy to check, that there is no pure equilibrium in this case.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENTATION
In a competitive game environment like in this problem, a typical solution
is to play the strategy corresponding to a Nash equilibrium. As seen from
the previous sections, however, a pure equilibrium may not exist in the gen-
eral multi-step game in either of the game settings. Since computing mixed
equilibria is an intractable problem, we need to devise easily implementable
strategies with reasonable performance guarantees. In this section, we pro-
pose such heuristics/algorithms which the UAVs can deploy as solutions to
the routing problem. We simulate plausible problem scenarios with randomly
generated game parameters and statistically compare these solutions on the
grounds of social welfare optimality.
7.1 Setup
The randomly generated game instances are in the following setting. The set
of cells is a 10ˆ10 grid. To allow arbitrary connectivity constraints, we have
a cell connectivity parameter δ which works as follows: For each cell, each
of the cells within a Chebychev distance of 1 (i.e. row-wise, column-wise, or
diagonal-wise adjacent cells and the cell itself) is independently chosen to be
its out-neighbor with probability δ; if no cells get chosen after having gone
through all the adjacent cells, we repeat the process until there is at least
one out-neighbor for the cell, so that the graph does not have sinks where
the UAVs can get stuck. We set the number of UAVs p “ 5, the number of
time-steps l “ 10, and cell-connectivity parameter δ “ 0.8.
In every game instance, the sensor effectiveness parameters of the UAVs
are initialized to values chosen uniformly at random (u.a.r.) from r0, 1s. The
edges of the graph are chosen randomly as per the cell connectivity parameter
δ as described above. The initial positions of the UAVs are chosen uniformly
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at random from the grid. The cell information values are chosen differently
for different problem scenarios as follows:
1 peak : In this scenario, the distribution of the information values
across cells as a function of their location is a generalized normal dis-
tribution. That is, we first pick a peak cell c from the grid u.a.r. and
then pick information values in all cells as a function of distance d from
the peak. This is represented as v “ fpdq “ α2´βdγ . Thereby, the
peak cell gets a value of α and the value decreases exponentially with
distance from the peak, as specified. The parameters α, β, and γ are
chosen u.a.r. from ranges r0.8, 1s, r0, 0.1s, r0.75, 1.25s, the last of which
(γ) acts as the shape parameter, and the ranges for the parameters
were fixed in order to keep the information values in a good range.
2 or more peaks : In this kind of a scenario, we fix a small k such as 2,3
etc. Subsequently, we pick k peak cells from the grid u.a.r. and the
information value function across all cells is composed of generalized
normal distributions centered around the k peaks respectively. For any
cell, the closest peak ci (i ď k) is determined, and the value in this cell
is given by v “ fipdq “ αi2´βidγi . Thus, peak ci has a value αi and the
values diminish in the other cells as we move away from the respective
peaks. The parameters αi’s, βi’s, and γi’s are again chosen u.a.r. from
the same ranges as scenario 1.
No peaks : In this scenario, all the information values in the cells are
simply chosen u.a.r. from r0, 1s.
As per the problem scenario, we generate n “ 1000 game instances with all
the parameters randomly chosen as described above. We let the UAVs apply
certain heuristics to route in the search space and collect information accord-
ingly. Finally, we compute the social welfare achieved for each game instance
as the output of the heuristics, and the two sequences of 1000 outputs for
the two strategies are compared is described in a following section.
Next, we describe the various heuristics we implement and compare.
7.2 Heuristics
We implement and compare the following heuristics:
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1. Greedy myopic: At each time-step this heuristic is to simply go to the
neighbor which currently has the maximum available information —
disregarding any other UAVs in the environment.
2. Multi-horizon greedy (parameters h, ): This heuristic considers walks
of length h as strategies, while still disregarding any other UAVs in the
environment. Since there are other UAVs however, the payoff that a
UAV would expect from a strategy if it were the sole player, would be
an over-estimate. To rectify this, the payoff from a cell x steps away is
discounted by a ratio of x when getting estimates for a strategy — due
to the fact that the actual payoff received from a cell in expectation
would be a smaller and smaller fraction of the optimistic estimate as the
cell gets more and more time-steps away, allowing more UAVs to get
the payoff first. Finally, the strategy with the highest such (discounted)
estimate is chosen. For our experimentation, we set h “ 5, and  “ 0.8.
3. One-step NE: As a pure NE is guaranteed to exist in single-step games,
this heuristic is to compute the pure NE that is obtained via Best-
response dynamics starting from the initial outcome of everyone choos-
ing the greedy myopic strategy. Each player computes this pure NE
and plays the strategy corresponding to this NE.
4. Multi-step NE (parameter h): In this heuristic, a UAV tries to compute
a pure NE via Best-response dynamics, for individual strategies being
walks of length h. Since this is not guaranteed to exist, if a pure NE
is not found within 2pl rounds of Best-response dynamics, the player
reduces the horizon to h´ 1 and repeats until a pure NE is found, for
horizon say h1, and plays the strategy corresponding to this NE. Note
that h1 ě 1 since a pure NE always exists in the single-step game.
We compare the latter two against the former two respectively, so as to
conclude that the heuristics involving the Nash equilibria, leveraging our
result of its guaranteed existence in the single-step game, perform as good
or better than the greedy behavior based strategies serving as benchmarks.
We now discuss how we compare the heuristics and the results obtained.
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7.3 Evaluation and Results
As aforementioned, we first compute a sequence of 1000 outputs (social wel-
fares) for any two heuristics h1 and h2 to be compared. Next, to compare h1
versus h2, we compute a metric which we call as the rf-curve. To do so, we
compute 2-D points pr, fq based on the two sequences of outputs by varying
r between 0.5 and 1.5, as follows: For each r, we compute the fraction of
games f in which the ratio of h1’s output to that of h2 is at least r. It is
easy to check that f as a function of r, is monotone. Also, we note that
the rf-curve definition is asymmetric — the rf-curve for h2 versus h1, can be
very different. The two curves are also related though as can be easily seen
— if pr, fq is a point on one, p1{r, 1 ´ fq is a point on the other, and vice
versa. For each pair of heuristics being compared, we simultaneously plot
both the rf-curves for the ease of visual clarity. The two heuristics can be
said to be roughly equally effective if the two rf-curves are close to being
coincidental. On the other hand, if one of the rf-curves quite consistently
dominates the other, the respective heuristic can be concluded to be more
effective. Moreover, the extent of the improvement is proportional to the
separation between the two rf-curves throughout the range of r.
(a) No peaks (b) One peak
Figure 6: Comparing the heuristics ‘Greedy myopic’ and ‘1-step NE’ for
scenarios ‘No peaks’ and ‘1 peak’
Figure 6 shows the results of comparison between the heuristics ‘Greedy
myopic’ and ‘1-step NE’ for scenarios ‘No peaks’ and ‘1 peak’. The plots for
scenarios ‘2 peaks’ and ‘3 peaks’ closely resembled the one for ‘1 peak’, and
thus, are not included. It is easy to see that ‘1-step NE’ is more effective than
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‘Greedy myopic’ in both the scenarios; more so in the ‘1 peak’ scenario as
reflected in the visibly higher degree of separation between the two rf-curves.
In the ‘No peaks’ scenario, in 97.7% of the games, its output is no worse than
97% that of ‘Greedy myopic’, and in 89.9% it is as good or better, while it
improves by 10% or more in 22.3% of the games. On the other hand, in the
‘1 peak’ scenario, in 95.2% of the games, its output is at least as good as
that of ‘Greedy myopic’, while it improves by 10% or more in 43.6% of the
games, and by 20% or more in 19.0% of the games.
(a) No peaks (b) One peak
Figure 7: Comparing the heuristics ‘Multi-horizon greedy (h “ 5,  “ 0.8)’
and ‘Multi-step NE (h “ 5)’ for scenarios ‘No peaks’ and ‘1 peak’
Figure 7 shows the results of comparison between the heuristics ‘Multi-
horizon greedy (h “ 5,  “ 0.8)’ and ‘multi-step NE(h “ 5)’ for scenarios
‘No peaks’ and ‘1 peak’. Again, the plots for scenarios ‘2 peaks’ and ‘3 peaks’
closely resembled the one for ‘1 peak, and thus, are not included. It is easy
to see that ‘multi-step NE’ is more effective than ‘Multi-horizon greedy’ in
both the scenarios; more so in the ‘1 peak’ scenario as reflected in the visibly
higher degree of separation between the two rf-curves. In the ‘No peaks’
scenario, in 98.0% of the games, its output is no worse than 97% that of the
greedy benchmark, while it improves by 10% or more in 52.2% of the games,
and by 20% or more in 21.9% of the games. On the other hand, in the ‘1
peak’ scenario, in 99.6% of the games, its output is at least as good as that
of the greedy benchmark, while it improves by 10% or more in 83.5% of the
games, by 20% or more in 53.6% of the games, and by 40% or more in 16.9%
of the games.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY
Our main results are as follows. We first study the basic setting of two
players and single time-step, albeit with the general formulation involving
multiple modalities and information fusion. We prove that a pure NE always
exists and is computable in linear time, in the case of moderate fusion as
well as significant fusion. We also prove tight bounds on PoA and PoS in
both these fusion cases. In case of moderate fusion, we also show that the
number of mixed equilibria has an upper-bound that is linear in the number
of strategies, and that the mixed equilibria are Pareto-dominated by the pure
equilibria.
By restricting the game to single modality, we study the multi-player single-
step case, and prove that a pure NE always exists in this game for both the
fusion cases, and more generally, in all the singleton congestion games having
a particular class of payoff functions. For the significant fusion case, we pro-
vide an efficient algorithm to compute a pure NE which runs in time linear
in the number of players times the number of strategies. Finally, assuming
no fusion and symmetric players, we prove a tight bound of 2 ´ 1{p on the
PoA where p is the number of players.
Finally, by further considering no fusion, we study the multi-player multi-
step game, in two differently defined classes of games. For each of them,
we provide concrete counter-examples to show that pure NE may not exist.
Further, for both the classes, we prove the pλ, µq–smoothness for λ “ µ “ 1
which leads to an upper bound of 2 on PoA and PoS, which we show to be
tight with concrete examples.
Finally we provide simple heuristics for the UAV routing problem, which
leverage on the result of existence of pure NE in the single-step game. By
simulating a large number of games via randomly generating game parame-
ters, in various plausible problem scenarios, we provide empirical bounds for
how good a social welfare can be achieved with these heuristics as compared
to the benchmark heuristics based on greedy behavior.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 6
We first establish an intermediate result required for the proof.
Lemma 11. Let 0 ă y ď 1, and let X be a set of npě 0q numbers such that
@x P X, 0 ă x ď 1. Then,
ź
xPX
p1´ xq ď
1´ p1´ yq ś
xPX
p1´ xq
y ` ř
xPX
x
ď
1´ ś
xPX
p1´ xqř
xPX
x
.
Proof. Let S “ ř
xPX
x, and P “ ś
xPX
p1´ xq. We want to prove,
P ď 1´ p1´ yqP
y ` S ď
1´ P
S
.
Now, consider the first inequality.
P ď 1´ p1´ yqP
y ` S
ô py ` SqP ď 1´ p1´ yqP
ô p1` SqP ď 1.
Next, the second inequality is,
1´ p1´ yqP
y ` S ď
1´ P
S
ô p1´ P ` PρqS ď py ` Sqp1´ P q
ô yPS ď yp1´ P q
ô p1` SqP ď 1. (17)
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Thus, proving (17) proves both the inequalities. Now, by the AM-GM in-
equality, we have,
1
n
˜ÿ
xPX
p1´ xq
¸
ě
˜ź
xPX
p1´ xq
¸1{n
pn´ Sq{n ě P 1{n
p1´ S{nqn ě P. (18)
Also, using the binomial theorem,
p1` S{nqn “
nÿ
i“0
ˆˆ
n
i
˙
pS{nqi
˙
ě 1` S. (19)
Hence, combining (18) and (19), we get,
p1` SqP ď p1` S{nqnp1´ S{nqn “ p1´ S2{n2qn ď 1.
Thus, this proves (17) as required, and thereby, this Lemma.
With this, we now prove Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let A be any multiset with support in P, and let i P A. Let c be
any cell and let S 1 Ď S be the set of outcomes for which A is the visitor set
for c. Then,
@s P S 1, piips, cq ě piA|´iA|i pcq.
Proof. Let s be an outcome with the visitor set for c being A. Suppose player
i visits c m times when the visitor set is A. The outcome s can be naturally
associated with two well-defined sequences X1, . . . , Xm and Y1, . . . , Ym as
follows. For each j, Xj denotes the set of players visiting c in the same
time-step as the jth visit of player i, and Yj denotes the multiset of all the
visitors visiting strictly before. Naturally, each Xj must contain player i,
and each Yj must contain i with a multiplicity of j ´ 1. Also, we must have
H Ď Y1 Ă Y2 . . . Ă Ym Ď Aztiu by definition. Let v be the information
initially available in c. The combined payoff of the visitors in Xj, as per our
notation, is pi
Yj
Xj
pcq. Player i gets a share of it proportional to ρi, and this
summed over all the visits gives its total payoff from visiting c:
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piips, cq “
mÿ
j“1
ρiř
kPXj
ρk
pi
Yj
Xj
pcq. (20)
For each j, let vj denote the information available in c just before the visitors
in Xj visit, which evaluates to vj “ v ś
kPYj
p1´ ρkqmYj pkq. Then, in terms of vj,
we can write
pi
Yj
Xj
pcq “ vj
¨˝
1´
ź
kPXj
p1´ ρkq‚˛.
Hence, (20) can be written as
piips, cq “
mÿ
j“1
ρivj
˜
1´ ś
kPXj
p1´ ρkq
¸
ř
kPXj
ρk
. (21)
Now, let s1 be another outcome with similarly defined sequencesX 11, . . . , X 1m
and Y 11 , . . . , Y 1m such that the only difference from s is that for each j, the
players visiting c in the same time-step as the jth visit of player i in the
outcome s, now visit strictly before it, in s1. Formally, for each j, we have
Y 1j “ YjZpXjztiuq and X 1j “ tiu. Thus, the visitor set remains A for s1. Now,
by definition, vj is the information available in c after the visitors in Yj have
visited it. Hence the information left after players in Xjztiu) subsequently
visit it, is vj
ś
kPXjztiu
p1´ ρkq. Hence, as player i’s jth visit to c follows, it gets
a payoff that is ρi fraction of the value available, and this summed over all
the visits gives the total payoff of player i from visiting c, for the outcome s1:
piips1, cq “
mÿ
j“1
¨˝
ρivj
ź
kPXjztiu
p1´ ρkq‚˛. (22)
Now, applying the first inequality from Lemma 11 on y “ ρi, X “ tρk|k P
Xjztiuu, we get,
piips1, cq ď
mÿ
j“1
ρivj
˜
1´ p1´ ρiq ś
kPXjztiu
p1´ ρkq
¸
ρi ` ř
kPXjztiu
ρk
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“
mÿ
j“1
ρivj
˜
1´ ś
kPXj
p1´ ρkq
¸
ř
kPXj
ρk
“ piips, cq. (23)
Further, let s2 be another outcome with similarly defined sequences X21 , . . .,
X2m and Y 21 , . . . , Y 2m and the visitor set for c being still A, such that all the
visits of player i are strictly after all the visits of all the players. Formally,
for each j, we have Y 2j “ A|´i Z ppj ´ 1q b tiuq and X2j “ tiu. Further,
piips2, cq “ piA|´iA|i pcq. Now, since s1 and s2 are such that all the visits of player
i are unaccompanied, we can write its payoff from the jth visit as simply
pi
Y 1j
tiupcq and pi
Y 2j
tiu pcq respectively. Now, the multiplicity of i is the same (=
j-1) in Y 1j and Y 2j , whereas all other players reside in Y 2j with the maximum
multiplicity possible for the visitor set A. Thus, Y 1j Ď Y 2j . Hence, using
Lemma 5, we get,
@j : piY
1
j
tiupcq ě pi
Y 2j
tiu pcq
mÿ
j“1
pi
Y 1j
tiupcq ě
mÿ
j“1
pi
Y 2j
tiu pcq
piips1, cq ě
mÿ
j“1
piA|´iZppj´1qbtiuqtiu pcq (By definition of Y 2j )
ě
mÿ
j“1
´
piHA|´iZpjbtiuqpcq ´ piHA|´iZppj´1qbtiuqpcq
¯
(Using Lemma 3)
ě piHA|´iZpmbtiuqpcq ´ piHA|´ipcq
ě piA|´ipmbtiuqpcq (Using Lemma 3)
ě piA|´iA|i pcq. (24)
Thus, it follows from (23) and (24), that, piips, cq ě piA|´iA|i pcq. Since this holds
for any outcome s for which the visitor set for cell c is A, the lemma is
proved.
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Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. For a cell c P C, let A and A˚ be the visitor sets of c for outcomes
s, s˚ P S respectively. Then,
piHA pcq `
ÿ
iPA˚
piA|´iA˚|i pcq ě piHA˚pcq. (11)
Proof. Proof We will show that,
piHA pcq `
ÿ
iPA˚zA
piA|´iA˚|i pcq ě piHAYA˚pcq. (25)
(Note that for multisets, A˚zA is defined to contain those elements which
have a greater multiplicity in A˚ than in A; and their multiplicity in A˚zA
is precisely the difference of multiplicities in A˚ and A.)
It is easy to see that the LHS of (11) is no less than that of (25) since the
latter possibly excludes some terms in the summation, and each term is non-
negative by definition. It is also easy to see that the RHS of (11) is no greater
than that of (25) by Lemma 4. Thus, it suffices to prove (25) to prove this
lemma.
Now we prove (25) by induction on the number of players in A˚zA, denoted
by, say, a.
The base case a “ 0 is when A˚ Ď A, i.e., A˚zA “ H. This holds trivially,
as both the sides of the inequality to be proven, become equal to piHA pcq.
Assume, as inductive hypothesis, that (25) holds whenever a ă a0, for some
a0 P Z`.
Now, consider the case when a “ a0. Arbitrarily fix some x P A˚zA. Then,
pA˚zAq|´x, or equivalently, A˚|´xzA has a0 ´ 1 distinct elements. We can
now write,
piHA pcq `
ÿ
iPA˚zA
piA|´iA˚|i pcq
“
¨˚
˝piHA pcq ` ÿ
iPA˚zA
i‰x
piA|´iA˚|i pcq
‹˛‚` piA|´xA˚|x pcq
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“
¨˝
piHA pcq `
ÿ
iPA˚|´xzA
piA|´ipA˚|´xq|ipcq‚˛` piA|´xA˚|x pcq
ě piHAYpA˚|´xqpcq ` pi
A|´x
A˚|x pcq (using the Ind. Hyp.)
ě piHpAYA˚q|´xpcq ` pi
A|´x
A˚|x pcq (since pAY A˚q|´x Ď AY pA˚|´xq)
(and using Lemma 4)
ě piHpAYA˚q|´xpcq ` pi
pAYA˚q|´x
A˚|x pcq (since pAY A˚q|´x Ě A|´x)
(and using Lemma 5)
“ piHpAYA˚q|´xpcq ` pi
pAYA˚q|´x
pAYA˚q|x pcq (since x P A˚zAñ pAY A˚q|x “ A˚|x)
“ piHAYA˚pcq.
Hence, this completes the inductive step and the proof by induction for (25),
as required.
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